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pronounced him able to understand the nature of his choice. The fact that
Simmons was determined sane after thorough evaluation and that he
maintained his desire for execution made it impossible, in the Court's
view, for Whitmore to show the necessary incapacity. The Court decided
Whitmore was not truly dedicated to Simmons' cause because his
attempt tojoin as next friend was based primarily on his own self-interest
in delaying the execution of his sentence, and not out of a sincere concern
for Simmons as an individual.

ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
A possible reason for the Court's strict holding in this case is to
avoid deciding whether the Constituition requires mandatory review of
capital cases. If Whitmore could have entered Simmons's case this
would have been the most obvious argument for him to make. The
Whitmore court specifically refused to rule on the matter, and the issue
is still open. Id. at 1723.
Virginia, unlike Arkansas, has a statutory provision requiring the
state supreme court to review all capital cases and sentences. Va. Code
Ann. § 17-110.1 (1990). Significantly, the statutory language is "review", as opposed to "appeal". This has been interpreted to require
review in all cases. Briley v. Bass, 854 F. Supp. 807 (E.D. Va. 1984),
construing Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.1 (1990).
It is possible that a question involving the intervention of a next
friend could arise in a Virginia capital case context. Virginia common
law on next friend (also called prochein ami) is more liberal than the
standard announced by the U.S. Supreme Court. Virginia does not
require the next friend to obtain the consent of the person he will
represent. SeeKirby v. Gilliam,28 S.E.2d 40 (Va. 1943); Va. Code Ann.
§ 8.01-8 (1984) In Virginia, there are also no formal requirements
needed togain admissionto thecourtas nextfriend. See Jacksonv. Counts,
54 S.E. 870 (Va. 1906). Presumably, it would be easier to bring a next
friend in for a Virginia capital defendant than it would be in Arkansas.
The code requires only thatthenext friend diligently press the cause once
he takes it, and makes no threshold demands on who can enter as next
friend on the litigant's behalf. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-8 (1990). For these
reasons it is unlikely that a case like Whitmore would arise in Virginia.

The dissent in Whitmore makes an interesting point in remarking
that under this holding there is no one who can enter under a general
concern for justice unless the defendant himself chooses to do so. The
interested party lacks standing by the Article III constraints. The only
alternative has been the traditional common law device of next friend.
Because the court intimates that only a near relative or acquaintance can
meet the strict requirements the majority imposes, a capital defendant
can force the state into executing an unlawful sentence, simply through
a waiver of appeal. In the opinion of the dissent, this clearly violates the
meaning of due process.
As a final point of analysis, the court mentioned in dicta that
despite Simmons's explicit desire to waive appeal and face execution,
his attorney still appeared before the court and outlined the avenues and
issues that were open to appeal. It might be argued that an attorney must
research and argue the merits ofthe case for the record, notwithstanding
the defendant's desire to be executed. Attorneys would also do well to
consider other resources to help persuade defendants to exercise their
rights guaranteed by law. A defendant in a recent capital case, Joseph
Savino, was initially willing to be executed. See, Savino v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534, 391 S.E.2d 276 (1990), and case summary of
Savino v. Commonwealth, CapitalDefense Digest, this issue. His attorney sought help from others, and ultimately Savino changed his mind
and went forward with his appeals process. Clients who volunteer for
execution may be an increasing problem for defense counsel. Of one
hundred forty people executed in the United States since reinstatement
of the death penalty in 1976, twenty-one have been volunteers. Nine of
those twenty-one, however, have been executed in the last sixteen
months. Death Row, U.S.A., N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Inc. (Sept. 21, 1990). Arguing the case over defendant's wishes
will at least preserve a record for a reasonable, albeit belated defense, if
the defendanthas achange ofheart. Counsel representing death sentenced
clients who wish to volunteer for execution may contact Virginia Capital
Case Clearinghouse for reference to persons skilled in counseling such
prisoners.
Summary and analysis by:
Peter T. Hansen

JUSTUS v. MURRAY
897 F.2d 709 (1990)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

FACTS

HOLDING

A finding of error injury selection by the Virginia Supreme Court
overturned the first conviction and death sentence of Buddy Earl Justus.
Justus v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 971, 266 S.E.2d 87 (1980). On
remand, Justus was again found guilty of capital murder during the
commission of rape under Code § 18.2-31(e), now § 18.2-31(5), and
sentenced to death. This second conviction and sentence was upheld on
appeal. Justus v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 667, 283 S.E.2d 905 (1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983 (1982).
Failing in state habeas proceedings, Justus sought federal habeas
relief. His first petition was dismissed without prejudice because it
contained unexhausted claims. He then raised these claims back to the
Virginia Supreme Court but was denied on the grounds that the claims
were procedurally defaulted.
Justus returned to U.S. District Court and refiled for habeas relief.
This petition was also dismissed. He then brought this appeal to the U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The dismissal was
affirmed.

By reference to the findings of the federal magistrate at U.S.
District Court, the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial on the
merits of two claims that related to the death sentence: ineffective
assistance of counsel at the penalty trial and denial of a court appointed
psychiatrist.
The remainder of Justus' claims were found defaulted under state
procedural requirements. Consequently the court refused to address
them.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Justus raised seven assignments of error to the Court of Appeals
fortheFourth Circuit. Theseclaims may beputinto three categories. The
first category, as noted, were two of appellant's claims turned down on
the merits throughout the state habeas process and likewise on federal
review by the U.S. District Court. The Circuit Court ofAppeals affirmed
the disposition of these claims.
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The second category consists of appellant's claim involving the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his death sentence. This matter
was not raised on direct appeal after trial. In state habeas, the Virginia
Circuit Court deemed the claim procedurally defaulted under Slayton v.
Parrigan,215Va.27,205 S.E.2d680 (1978), cert.denied,419 U.S. 1108
(1979), which held that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus may not act
as a substitute for a proper appeal based upon an objection not made at
trial.
In federal habeas, Justus did not offer cause to excuse the default.
This prompted a recommendation of dismissal of the claim under
Wainwrightv. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), which requires both a showing
of cause for not complying with state procedure and a showing of
prejudice to the defendant before a claim will be addressed by the federal
court. One of the excuses for failing to follow state procedure is
ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). Justus did not claim ineffective
assistance of counsel as cause for the default until after the magistrate's
recommendation of dismissal had been adopted by the U.S. District
Court. In the instant case, the 4th Circuit, citing Murrayv. Carrier,477
U.S. 478,488-89 (1986), upheld the procedural bar because the "IAC as
cause" claim had neitherbeen raised in the federal petition norpresented
to and exhausted in the state courts.
The third category consists of the last four claims. These claims
were also not raised on direct appeal and were lost by another variation
of the Murray rule. However, unlike his previous claim at state habeas,
Justus asserted ineffective assistance ofcounsel as cause for the default.
The state habeas court rejected the IAC claims on the merits and as a
result the underlying substantive claims fell with them.
When Justus appealed the state habeas decision to the Virginia
Supreme Court, however, he did not separately assign error to the denial
of his "IAC as cause" claims. He did raise the substantive claims
themselves, probably believing that the IAC claims would be carried
along. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the holding that the
substantive claims were defaulted under Slayton.
At federal habeas, Justus again raised his four procedurallydefaulted substantive claims and the procedurally-defaulted IAC claims
as cause. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the
underlying substantive claims could not be considered because the IAC
claims that might have kept them alive were also procedurally defaulted.
It termed this failure "double default." Justus 897 F.2d at 712.
The hair splitting analysis of this decision, based upon a process
that is already very complicated, serves to reinforce the necessity for

preserving appealable issues with the utmost care. Several valuable
lessons may be extracted. First, "ineffective assistance of counsel claims
offered as cause to excuse procedural defaults of other constitutional
claims are separateand distinctfrom those other constitutional claims."
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986)(emphasis added). An
IAC claim and any underlying substantive claims are not inextricably
linked. Again, it is likely that counsel assumed that appeal of the state
habeas decision on the substantive issues would automatically carry the
IAC claims offered as cause for default. This is not so. IAC claims used
as "cause" under Sykes to cure a default must be separately appealed or
are themselves defaulted.
Second, there is a range ofinattention by counsel which can forfeit
constitutional claims, yet not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Sykes, recall, permits reviving an otherwise defaulted claim with a
showing of cause and prejudice. Under Sykes, the failure of counsel to
comply with state procedure can supply the "cause" prong, but only ifthe
failure can be characterized as so egregious as to fall below the minimal
constitutional standard described in Stricklandv. Washington,466 U.S.
668, 687-88 (1984). Both Sykes and Strickland also require a further
showing of prejudice.
Because the Strickland standard permits a great deal of bad
lawyering without terming it constitutionally deficient, (See Marlowe,
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Capital Defense Digest, this issue),
there exists a Sykes-Strickland "gap." That is, an attorney may cause a
possibly life-saving claim to be barred from federal review under Sykes
and still not be ineffective under Strickland.
Sykes andStricklandare not new cases. One can argue that the bar
should realize the pitfalls of default by now such that future failure by
counsel to comply with state procedural requirements is IAC under
Strickland and "cause" under Sykes. The procedural default requirements in Virginia should be well known to counsel from experience in
non-capital cases. More importantly, any casual reading of Virginia
Supreme Court opinions in capital cases win reveal them to be replete
with findings that claims have been defaulted. (See Powley, Perfecting
the Record of a CapitalCase in Virginia, Capital Defense Digest, this
issue.) Attorneys representing death-sentenced prisoners at state or
federal habeas may wish to urge directly that the gap be closed.
Summary and analysis by:
Christopher J. Lonsbury

SAVINO v. COMMONWEALTH
239 Va. 534, 391 S.E.2d 276 (1990)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On April 24, 1989, Joseph John Savino pled guilty to a capital
murder indictment charging that he did "willfully, deliberately, feloniouslyand with premeditation, kill andmurderThos 'Thomas' McWaters,
Jr. in the commission ofrobbery while armed with a deadly weapon," in
violation of Va. Code § 18.2-31(4). Savino also pled guilty to the
commission of the underlying robbery. By entering pleas of guilty,
Savino waived his right to ajury trial and the Commonwealth presented
its evidence in support of the indictment. Finding Savino guilty of both
capital murder and robbery, the court proceeded to the sentencing phase
of Virginia's bifurcated trial procedure. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4
(1990).
Pursuant to Savino's request, the trial court appointed a qualified
mental health expert, Dr. Lisa Hovermale, to assist Savino in the
preparation and presentation of his defense. Savino intended to present

Hovermale's testimony in support of his theory of mitigation. Adhering
to the rules prescribed by statute, he gave notice of his intention to the
Commonwealth Attorney. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3: 1(E) (1990). In
response, the Commonwealth motioned the Court, pursuant to 3:l(F) to
compel Savino to submit to an evaluation by its own expert "concerning
theexistence orabsence ofmitigating circumstances" relating to Savino's
mental condition atthe time ofthe murder. Savino v. Commonwealth,239
Va. 534,391 S.E.2d 276,280-81 (1990). The court appointed Dr. Arthur
Centor, a clinical psychologist, to examine and interview Savino.
At the sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth presented Dr.
Centor's testimony as aggravating evidence. During his testimony,
Centor opined that Savino showed signs of future dangerousness.
Following the prosecution's use of Centor's testimony, Savino offered
Hovermale's testimony to support his theory of mitigation. Savino
objected to Centor's opinions regarding Savino's future dangerousness
as "unreliable." Additionally, Savino objected to the Commonwealth's

